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Do contractive monetary policy and adverse economic conditions reduce bank loan 
supply (Bernanke and Gertler 1989; Bernanke and Gertler 1995)? And does the reduc-
tion in credit availability depend on bank balance-sheet strength (Bernanke and Gertler 
1987; Bernanke and Blinder 1988; Bernanke 2007)? That is, do agency costs of bor-
rowing between banks and their financiers—proxied by bank capital– and liquidity–to–
total assets ratios as in Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) and Diamond and Rajan (2011), 
for example—make lending significantly more problematic during periods of higher 
monetary policy rates or lower economic activity? Put differently, is a bank balance 
sheet channel operational, and, if so, how potent is it?
To convincingly answer these questions two major identification challenges need 
to be addressed. First, the supply of credit needs to be disentangled from its demand. 
Tighter monetary conditions and lower economic growth may reduce both loan 
supply and demand. Supply may contract because—as already indicated—agency 
costs of banks may increase, but demand may contemporaneously fall because firm 
net worth and expectations for investment are reduced, and the cost of financing 
is higher.1 In addition, firms affected more by monetary and economic conditions 
1 See Bernanke and Gertler (1995) and Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1996). The external finance premium in 
lending depends inversely on the borrowers’ net worth (see Freixas and Rochet 2008). When borrowers have little 
wealth at stake, the potential divergence of interests between the borrower and the suppliers of external funds is 
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may borrow more from affected banks (Gertler and Gilchrist 1994). All this implies 
that any analysis based only on macro data (Bernanke and Blinder 1992) or bank-
level data (Kashyap and Stein 2000) may suffer from an omitted-variables problem. 
Second, if country business cycle conditions completely determine short-term inter-
est rate changes, which may be the case in many countries (e.g., through a Taylor 
1993–rule), separating the effects of monetary conditions from those of economic 
activity is problematic.
Our main contribution to the literature consists in taking crucial steps in address-
ing both identification challenges. In particular, we analyze the effects of monetary 
conditions and economic activity on the granting of loans with individual loan appli-
cation records depending on the strength of bank balance sheets measured by bank 
capital and liquidity ratios, controlling for time-varying observed and unobserved 
firm heterogeneity with firm-month fixed effects (i.e., there is a dummy for every 
firm–year:month combination). The data are from Spain, a country where most 
firms are bank dependent and where monetary policy has been fairly exogenous.
Unique features of the Credit Register of Spain (CIR), which is collected by the 
Banco de España acting in its capacity as bank supervisor, help us to attain identifi-
cation. During the last nine years the CIR recorded all monthly information requests 
lodged by banks on borrowers. Because banks monthly receive information on all 
outstanding loans and defaults of their current borrowers from CIR, they file infor-
mation requests only following loan applications from firms that are currently not 
borrowing from them. Because the CIR database also contains detailed monthly 
information on all, new and outstanding, loans (over 6,000 euros) to nonfinancial 
firms granted by all credit institutions operating in Spain since 1984, we can match 
the set of corresponding loan applications with the loan that is actually granted by 
a bank. The loans granted to noncurrent borrowers surely do not involve simply 
the renewal or evergreening of outstanding loans. Moreover, Banco de España has 
complete monthly bank balance-sheet information also collected in its role as bank 
supervisor and has access to key firm characteristics, including identity. We analyze 
2,335,321 loan applications in total.
The unique features of the CIR allow us to address the two major identification 
challenges. First, to separate bank loan supply from demand we study loan applica-
tions and exploit theoretically motivated interactions between economic and mon-
etary conditions on the one hand and bank balance-sheet strength variables on the 
other (Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist 1996; Kashyap and Stein 2000). The defi-
nition of the bank capital– and liquidity–to–total assets ratios we employ closely 
follows the theoretical literature that attributes a prominent role to net worth in 
reducing the agency costs of borrowing (Holmstrom and Tirole 1997; Holmstrom 
and Tirole 1998; Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist 1999; Gertler and Kiyotaki 2010), 
larger, increasing agency costs. In equilibrium, lenders must be compensated. As borrower net worth is procyclical 
(because profits and asset prices are procyclical), the external finance premium is countercyclical, amplifying the 
changes in credit availability (Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist 1999; Matsuyama 2007). In Holmstrom and Tirole 
(1997) the agency problems depend on the capital-to-total-assets ratio; in Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) 
net worth is also associated with the liquidity of the assets. Since banks not only face agency problems with their 
borrowers, but banks themselves are also borrowing funds from their depositors and other financiers, bank net worth 
may determine their own agency costs of borrowing (Bernanke 2007; Gertler and Kiyotaki 2010). See also Stiglitz 
and Weiss (1981). Boivin, Kiley, and Mishkin (2010) review the recent literature.
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which sharpens the interpretation of the coefficients on their interactions with mon-
etary and economic conditions.
To achieve identification we further focus on the set of loan applications made 
in the same month by the same borrower or for the same loan to different banks 
of varying balance-sheet strengths (by including in the specifications firm-month 
or alternatively loan fixed effects). Within this set of loan applications, for which 
the (observed and unobserved) quality of potential borrowers is constant as in the 
credit crunch definition by Bernanke and Lown (1991), we study how monetary 
and economic conditions affect the granting of loans depending on bank capital and 
liquidity. Moreover, we analyze whether firms that get rejected in their initial loan 
application can undo the resultant reduction in credit availability by successfully 
applying to other banks.
Second, to distinguish between the impact of monetary and economic conditions, 
we rely on the observation that monetary policy in Spain has been fairly exogenous 
during the sample period. Spain accounts for around 10 percent of the euro area out-
put and as a peripheral country its business cycle did not converge with those of the 
core countries of the euro area (Giannone, Lenza, and Reichlin 2010).
Our study yields the following robust results: higher short-term interest rates or 
lower GDP growth reduce the probability that a loan application is granted. The neg-
ative effect of higher short-term interest rate on loan granting is statistically stronger 
for banks with low capital or liquidity, whereas the negative effect of lower GDP 
growth is statistically stronger for banks with low capital.2 The estimated effects are 
also economically relevant. A 100–basis point increase (decrease) in the interest rate 
(GDP growth) reduces loan granting by weak banks by 11 (5) percent more than 
by strong banks (i.e., a weak bank is in the tenth percentile in both bank capital and 
liquidity; a strong bank is in the ninetieth percentile).
All findings are robust to multiple controls, in particular to the inclusion of firm-
month or loan fixed effects, implying that within the set of applications made in the 
same month or for the same loan by the same firm to different banks, banks with 
weaker balance sheets grant fewer loan applications when short-term interest rate 
are higher or when GDP growth is lower. This is the first evidence—we think—that 
clearly identifies that, under tighter monetary or economic conditions, low bank 
capital or liquidity begets a credit crunch. Finally, we find that firms that get rejected 
in their initial loan application cannot undo the resultant reduction in credit avail-
ability by applying to other banks, especially in periods of tighter monetary and 
economic conditions.
Overall, our results suggest that the strength of bank balance sheets plays a sta-
tistically significant and economically relevant role in channeling changes in short-
term interest rates and economic growth to the availability of credit. The rest of the 
article proceeds as follows. Section I presents the hypotheses we test, the database 
2 Loan applications have been available only during the last nine years. Hence, we also analyze the impact of 
monetary and economic conditions on the intensive margin of lending by employing all granted business loans in 
Spain during the 1988:II–2008:IV period. We saturate the specifications—which we further leave unreported—with 
firm-quarter fixed effects to account for unobserved (and observed) time-varying firm heterogeneity, where 80 per-
cent of the credit volume is from firms with multiple banking relationships. We similarly find that for the same firm 
borrowing from at least two different banks in the same quarter the amount borrowed from the weaker bank declines 
more when monetary or economic conditions are tighter.
2304 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW AuGuST 2012
we analyze, and the empirical strategy we employ. Section II explains the variables 
in detail and presents and discusses the results. Section III concludes and discusses 
the policy implications.
I. Hypotheses, Data, and Empirical Strategy
A. Hypotheses
The theory modeling how monetary and economic conditions affect loan supply, 
which we briefly summarized in the Introduction, yields two key testable hypotheses:
(H1) Higher short-term interest rates or lower GDP growth contract credit avail-
ability. (H2) The negative impact of higher short-term interest rates or lower GDP 
growth on credit availability is stronger for banks with lower capital or liquidity.
We address the main identification challenge with monthly loan application data 
and an empirical strategy based on interactions of monetary and economic condi-
tions with bank capital– and liquidity–to–total assets ratios and combinations of 
fixed effects, notably firm-month or loan fixed effects.3 We first discuss the dataset 
and then the empirical strategy we employ.
B. Data
The Credit Register of the Banco de España (CIR) contains confidential infor-
mation on virtually all business loans granted by all banks operating in Spain. In 
particular, we focus on applications for commercial and industrial (C&I) loans 
(82 percent of total loans) by nonfinancial publicly limited and limited liability 
companies (that account for around 95 percent of all firms) to commercial banks, 
savings banks, and credit cooperatives (that account for more than 95 percent of 
the entire Spanish financial system).4 The CIR is almost comprehensive, as the 
reporting threshold for a loan is only 6,000 euros. Given that we consider only 
C&I loans, this threshold is very low, which alleviates any concerns about unob-
served changes in bank credit to small and medium-sized enterprises (which may 
be more influenced by changes in monetary policy and business cycle under the 
3 A large empirical literature has investigated the bank– and firm–balance sheet channels of monetary policy and 
the business cycle independently, with the analysis done at macro, bank, or the firm level. On the macro and on the 
bank side, see Bernanke and Blinder (1992); Jayaratne and Morgan (2000); Kashyap and Stein (2000); Kishan and 
Opiela (2000); Ashcraft (2006); and Black, Hancock, and Passmore (2009), among others. On the firm side, see 
Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) and Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1996), for example. The literature accounted for 
loan demand through observed firm characteristics like industry or by interactions between economic/monetary 
conditions and bank/firm characteristics. There is also an empirical literature analyzing the balance sheet channels; 
see Gan (2007); Khwaja and Mian (2008); and Chaney, Sraer, and Thesmar (2009), among others. However, as far 
as we are aware, no paper so far has analyzed loan applications and included firm-month fixed effects to account for 
observed and unobserved time variation in firm loan demand and quality. As we argue in this section, loan applica-
tions and firm-time fixed effects are both necessary to identify the bank lending channel of monetary policy. Puri, 
Rocholl, and Steffen (2011) study loan applications from household loans, but do not use borrower fixed effects.
4 Delgado, Salas, and Saurina (2007) explain the main features of the Spanish banking system, focusing on the 
differences in behavior of commercial banks, savings banks, and credit cooperatives. All of them compete under 
the same rules. See also Jiménez, Salas, and Saurina (2006).
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credit channel theory, for example).5 More than 350 banks and 130,000 firms are 
active in the CIR at any moment in time.
All banks in Spain automatically receive monthly updated information on the total 
current credit exposures and (possible) loan defaults—vis-à-vis all banks in Spain—of 
their own current borrowers. This information is extracted for the banks from the CIR. 
Any bank can also request this information on potential borrowers, which are defined 
as “any firm that seriously approaches the bank to obtain credit.” The monetary cost 
of requesting this information is zero. But a law stipulates that a bank cannot ask for 
the information without consent by the potential borrower, indicating a seriousness of 
intent regarding the “financial relationship between bank and firm.”
We observe all requests for information on potential borrowers after 2002:02 
(before this date the requests were not stored). Though the requests can be made 
at any time, they are collated monthly and uniquely link borrowers with banks. 
Requests for information on firms that are currently borrowing from the requesting 
bank would yield information that is already known to this bank. Consequently, 
requesting information from the CIR is useful only if the firm has never before 
received a loan from the bank (that is requesting the information) or when the rela-
tionship between the firm and the bank ended before. In this way, the information 
requests focus on a key category of borrowers that do not simply renew or even 
evergreen existing loans at their current bank, but that seek new loans from another 
bank, i.e., the extensive margin of new lending.6
We analyze all requests lodged until 2008:12. Following the intensification of the 
crisis during the autumn of 2008 the European Central Bank took unprecedented 
action via both standard and nonstandard measures, altering the operation of the 
bank lending channel of monetary policy we wish to investigate. Nonetheless, in 
robustness we analyze our benchmark regression to an extension of the sample 
period to 2010:06.
For each request lodged between 2002:02 and 2008:12, we also observe whether 
the loan is accepted and granted, or not, by matching the loan application database 
with the CIR database, which contains the stock of all loans granted. Therefore, if 
multiple banks request information on a particular borrower within a three-month 
period, we can infer the bank that granted the loan and the banks that did not (results 
5 See, e.g., Gertler and Gilchrist (1993); Gertler and Gilchrist (1994); Bernanke and Gertler (1995); and 
Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1996). The Credit Register contains more than 2,400,000 loans in the last month 
of 2008. The commercial and financial loans we study in this paper represent 82.6 percent of all loans that are 
granted (excluding leasing, factoring, and other specialized loans). Incomplete coverage of the widely used US 
(National) Survey of Small Business Finances or Loan Pricing Corporation datasets, for example, may complicate 
any analysis of bank lending.
6 Since we cannot observe firm loan applications to their current banks, we also study firms that do not have any 
bank loan outstanding at the time of the loan application in robustness. These firms are noncurrent for all banks 
and hence we have the loan applications from all the banks. Credit needs and application propensity for this set 
of firms may also be more similar. Notice that approximately one fifth of the loans to borrowers entirely new to 
the bank are granted without any information request on record during the last sample quarter. This statistic shows 
that while the monetary cost of requesting the information is zero, nonpecuniary costs may not be. For example, 
an information request may slight borrowers (whose consent is required), involves waiting, uses management time 
processing the information, and/or may result in a loss of reputation vis-à-vis the Banco de España if prospects 
turn idle. Especially for the very good or connected borrowers that don’t take a “check-and-wait” for an answer or 
during economic expansions when capacity constraints at the bank become binding, these nonpecuniary costs may 
be relevant. Banks may further not request information about the largest firms, for example, because these firms deal 
with many banks, are well-known, and/or do not seek regular loans. Our unreported empirical work on the intensive 
margin using all the actual loans granted to all firms addresses ensuing concerns on this account.
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are unaltered when we use two- and one-month matching periods). In case a bank 
requests information but does not grant the loan, either the bank denied the firm 
credit or the firm perceived the offered conditions by the bank to be less attractive 
than those of the loan it eventually took. Hence, we can link loan granting for the 
same firm within each month to bank balance-sheet strength.
We match the application dataset with bank and firm datasets, so that we have bal-
ance-sheet information for each bank that receives a loan application and/or grants 
a loan and for each firm that applies for a loan. The banks’ dataset, at a monthly 
frequency starting in 1984, is owned by the Banco de España in its role as banking 
supervisor. The firms’ dataset is available from the Spanish Mercantile Register at 
a yearly frequency and commences in 1992. We can match (to the firm-level data) 
816,852 loan applications constituting the starting sample.7
C. Empirical Strategy
As we have the loan applications plus bank characteristics, in particular their capi-
tal and liquidity ratios as measures of their balance sheet strength, plus firm char-
acteristics including identity, we are able to better disentangle the supply from the 
demand for loans. Through the loan applications, loan demand for each bank is in a 
sense given and observed, and each bank has to decide only on the granting of each 
loan—“its loan supply”—knowing the firm. As far as we are aware, ours is the first 
article that analyzes the impact of monetary and economic conditions on the prob-
ability loans are granted following applications from firms.
To analyze the bank lending channel we exploit the cross-sectional implica-
tions of the sensitivity of credit availability to monetary and economic conditions 
according to the strength of the bank balance sheets (see, e.g., Kashyap and Stein 
2000). Following the theoretical literature we focus on bank net worth and liquidity. 
Because of lack of data, most other studies had to rely on size or debt as a proxy 
for net worth. Following Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) we define net worth as the 
capital–to–total assets ratio.8 Following Bernanke and Gertler (1995), Kashyap and 
Stein (2000), and Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) we also feature a liquidity measure. 
As many banks actively deal with loan applications there is ample cross-sectional 
variation in both measures. To maximize variation in balance-sheet strengths across 
banks, we follow Kashyap and Stein (2000) and control for key time-varying bank 
characteristics (and only in robustness we include bank fixed effects).
Last but not least, to fully convincingly identify bank loan supply changes (as in 
the definition of Bernanke and Lown 1991) we focus on models that include either 
firm-month or loan fixed effects. Such models analyze the success of loan applica-
tions made by the same firm within the same month (or within three months for the 
same loan) to multiple banks that possibly differ in capital and liquidity. If monetary 
and economic conditions affect firm balance-sheet strength and/or loan demand 
(Bernanke and Gertler 1995), identification of loan supply requires controlling for 
7 When the firm characteristics are replaced in the specifications by the various sets of fixed effects, we com-
mence again from the initial sample of 2,335,321 loan applications.
8 Off–balance sheet volumes are very small in Spain. Hence, total bank assets cover most of the banks’ busi-
nesses. Banks did not develop conduits or Structured Investment Vehicles (SIVs) because the prevailing accounting 
rules made banks consolidate these items and set aside sufficient capital.
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all observed and unobserved time-varying firm heterogeneity through either firm-
month or loan fixed effects. To analyze and quantify the total effect of monetary and 
economic conditions on loan granting, we can only include observable firm char-
acteristics and firm fixed effects in the specifications, thereby inevitably weaken-
ing loan supply identification. Therefore, we report specifications with and without 
firm-month or loan fixed effects.
Finally, we investigate whether the loan supply restrictions we identified so far are 
binding and cannot be fully offset by firms turning to other banks.9 Since firms may 
shift their applications between banks of different balance-sheet strengths, possibly 
neutralizing the supply effect measured with loan applications, we also study the 
success of future loan applications by firms that were either denied credit or, in gen-
eral, the granting of any bank loans for firms that had applied to at least one bank.
Monetary policy in Spain has been fairly exogenous during the last 20 years, 
first when it was linked to the Bundesbank and then, as of January 1, 1999, within 
the Eurosystem (see Banco de España 1997 and Jiménez et al. 2008). Moreover, 
economic conditions in Germany (or the other core euro area countries) and Spain 
were only weakly correlated during the sample period. Consequently, there is a sig-
nificant exogenous variation in monetary conditions, allowing us to disentangle its 
effects from those of local Spanish economic conditions.
Motivated by Bernanke and Gertler (1989); Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999); 
Ruckes (2004); and Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2006), among others, and because of 
the presence in our sample of many small firms, we concurrently study the effect 
of both monetary and economic conditions on lending to firms. Though the current 
recession in Spain, for example, was partly initiated by the financial crisis abroad, pro-
viding a modicum of exogeneity to its start, in general, economic conditions are hardly 
exogenous to bank lending. But, for a given firm, economic conditions are fairly exog-
enous, and, in key specifications, all time-varying firm heterogeneity will be absorbed 
by firm-month fixed effects. Therefore, both to analyze the impact of economic condi-
tions on loan granting and as a key control for monetary conditions (i.e., in a Taylor-
rule setting GDP growth determines short-term interest rates, for example), we also 
feature economic conditions in all benchmark regressions. In robustness we neverthe-
less also exclude it (and its interactions).
To analyze the bank lending channel, we use simple measures of monetary and 
economic conditions, i.e., the change in a short-term interest rate and GDP growth, 
which we detail and motivate further soon. To complete our specifications we include 
inflation, as an important economic determinant of short-term interest rates, and 
month, or firm-month, fixed effects that control for other macroeconomic factors.
II. Dependent Variable, Independent Variables, and Results
In this section we provide the main results of the article. We first define the main 
dependent variable, the independent variables, and the estimated specifications. 
Then we discuss the results.
9 We analyze substitution of credit within the bank system given both the time frequency of the available data 
and the fact that Spain has a bank-dominated financial system and, therefore, bank loans constitute the majority of 
firm debt.
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A. Main Dependent Variable: LOAN APPLICATION IS GRANTED
Table 1 defines the dependent and independent variables employed in the first 
set of empirical specifications, as well as their descriptive statistics. The dependent 
variable we feature first is LOAN APPLICATION IS GRANTED (we recurrently 
shorthand this as “loan granting”), which equals one if the loan application by firm 
i at time t is approved by bank b and the loan is granted in month t to t + 3, and 
equals zero otherwise (results are unaffected if the loan is granted in t to t + 1 or in 
t to t + 2). The average value of loan granting equals 42 percent (online Appendix 
A reports the number of loan applications and the loan granting probabilities simply 
by bank and firm capital ratio and total assets; some of the patterns that arise will be 
overturned in our analysis that controls for many more bank and firm characteristics 
and includes firm or firm-month fixed effects).
We match each loan application with its relevant bank and firm characteristics, in 
particular firm identity. The inclusion of firm (or firm-month) fixed effects in a logit 
(or probit) model naturally restricts the sample to those firms that filed at least one 
application that did result in a loan granted and one application that did not during 
the sample period (or in a month). To avoid this selection problem we employ linear 
probability models in the main regressions but study logit models in robustness. An 
additional advantage of employing linear probability models is that for the interac-
tion terms, the main focus of the analysis, the estimated coefficients are directly 
interpretable and the standard errors require no corrections.10
B. Independent Variables
As independent variables we include an array of macroeconomic conditions and 
bank/firm characteristics to control for changes in the quality and the propensity 
during the business cycle of different types of firms to apply for loans to a poten-
tially varying set of banks that request information and approve the loans. The speci-
fications do not include the characteristics of the loans that are granted, because 
these are the outcome of the application and granting process, but loan fixed effects 
that comprehensively account for loan-level quality heterogeneity are included 
later (online Appendix B provides summary statistics for all 346,884 loans granted; 
online Appendix C provides the mean loan characteristics by total firm assets).
Macroeconomic Conditions.—As macroeconomic conditions we include a short-
term interest rate measure of the annual changes in monetary policy conditions, 
annual GDP growth, and the annual inflation rate. According to Hypothesis 1 (H1) 
we expect the coefficient on the interest rate to be negative and the coefficient on 
GDP growth to be positive.
Our measure for the changes in monetary conditions, ΔIR, is the change in the 
Spanish 3-month interbank interest rate during the last year. The average change in 
10 In nonlinear models the ordinarily reported standard errors and marginal effects of interacted variables require 
corrections (Ai and Norton 2003; Norton, Wang, and Ai 2004). For the benchmark specification we compare the 
standard errors of the linear probability model with the noncorrected and corrected standard errors of the logit 
model. In all cases the results are very similar.
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Table 1—Summary Statistics
Variable Units Definition Mean SD Min Median Max
Dependent variable
 LOAN APPLICATION IS 
GRANTEDibt
0/1 = 1 if the loan application by a firm 
is approved and the loan is granted 
by a bank, = 0 otherwise
0.42 0.49 0 0 1
Independent variables
Macroeconomic conditions (t)
ΔIRt % Annual change of Spanish 3-month 
interbank interest rates
0.19 0.83 −1.56 0.19 1.41
ΔGDPt % Annual change of Spanish gross 
domestic product in real terms
3.13 0.93 −0.85 3.35 3.98
ΔCPIt % Annual change of Spanish 
Consumer Price Index
3.33 0.77 1.43 3.40 5.27
Bank characteristics (b)
BANK CAPITAL RATI O bt−1 % The ratio of bank equity over total 
assets of the bank
5.37 2.07 0.00 4.82 63.15
BANK LIQuIDITy RATI O bt−1 % The ratio of liquid assets (cash and 
balance with central banks, and 
loans and advances to governments 
and credit institutions) held by the 
bank over the total assets of the bank
17.02 8.03 0.04 15.83 92.07
ln(TOTAL ASSET S bt−1 ) — The log of the total assets of the 
bank
17.39 1.47 9.57 17.61 19.90
TOTAL ASSET S bt−1 000,000.000 
EUR
The total assets of the bank 78.00 87.60 0.01 44.20 437.00
RO A bt−1 % The total net income over assets of 
the bank
0.94 0.55 −8.93 0.91 11.92
DOuBTFuL LOANS RATI O bt−1 % The doubtful loan ratio of the bank 0.83 0.85 0.00 0.56 31.24
HERFINDAHL By INDuSTR y bt−1 % The Herfindahl-Hirschman index 
of the bank’s credit portfolio by 
industry
26.35 8.86 12.77 23.20 87.94
Firm characteristics (i)
FIRM CAPITAL RATI O it−1 % The ratio of own funds over total 
assets of the firm
24.52 20.73 0.00 18.67 100
FIRM LIQuIDITy RATI O it−1 % The ratio of current assets over total 
assets of the firm
41.14 26.91 0.00 38.26 100
TOTAL ASSET S it−1 000.000 
EUR
The total assets of the firm 6.98 75.95 0.00 1.32 27,200.00
ln(TOTAL ASSET S it−1 ) — The log of the total assets of the firm 7.26 1.62 0.86 7.19 17.12
AG E it−1 years The age of the firm 10.30 9.25 0 8 132
ln(1 + AG E it−1 ) — The log of one plus the age of the 
firm
2.10 0.86 0.00 2.20 4.89
RO A it−1 % The return on assets of the firm 6.46 9.74 −36.07 4.89 63.16
I(DOuBTFuL LOANS AT THE 
 TIME OF THE REQuES T it−1 )
0/1 = 1 if the firm had doubtful loans 
the month before the loan was 
requested, = 0 otherwise
0.01 0.09 0 0 1
I(DOuBTFuL LOANS BEFORE 
 THE TIME OF THE  
 REQuES T it−1 )
0/1 = 1 if the firm had doubtful loans 
before the previous month to the 
loan request, = 0 otherwise
0.09 0.29 0 0 1
NuMBER OF MONTHS WITH
 THE BAN K ibt−1 
months The duration of the relationship 
between firm and bank
7.84 23.48 0 0 278
ln(1 + NuMBER OF MONTHS 
 WITH THE BAN K ibt−1 )
— The log of one plus the duration of 
the relationship between firm and 
bank
0.63 1.36 0 0 5.63
NuMBER OF BANK 
 RELATIONSHIP S ibt−1 
— The number of banks the firm is 
currently borrowing from
3.90 3.66 0 3 102
ln(1 + NuMBER OF BANK 
 RELATIONSHIP S ibt−1 )
— The log of the number of bank 
relationships of the firm
1.35 0.65 0 1.39 4.63
Industry characteristic (s)
INDuSTRy DOuBTFuL LOANS 
 RATI O st−1 
% The doubtful loan ratio of the 
industry in which the firm operates
0.91 0.60 0.06 0.73 4.91
Province characteristic (p)
NuMBER OF BANK S pt−1 — The number of banks in the province 
where the firm is located
116.52 32.52 11 111 179
ln(NuMBER OF BANK S pt−1 ) — The log of the number of banks 
in the province where the firm is 
located
4.72 0.29 2.40 4.71 5.19
Notes: The number of observations equals 816,852. t: 1 to 83, b: 1 to 184, i: 1 to 267,618, s: 1 to 10, and p: 1 to 52. 
EUR = 2008 euros.
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the three-month interest rate during the sample period was 0.23 percent, ranging 
between −1.56 and 1.41 percent. The use of variations in the short-term interest rate 
as a measure that proxies the change in the stance of monetary policy is fully in line 
with the literature analyzing the credit channel at the micro level.11 Our main results 
are unaffected if we employ the level rather than the change in this interest rate. The 
use of a three-month interest rate is in line with many articles in Angeloni, Kashyap, 
and Mojon (2003), for example, that also use European data. Using the change in 
the overnight interbank interest rate yields very similar results, not surprisingly, as 
the correlation between the two series equals 0.95.
GDP growth, ΔGDP, is available only quarterly, while both the interest rate 
changes and the inflation rate are measured monthly. Hence, to be consistent with the 
frequency of loan applications and the other macroeconomic measures, we interpolate 
GDP growth for all intermediary months (results are unaffected if we do not inter-
polate). Thus defined, GDP growth averages 3.14 percent and varies between −0.85 
and 3.98 percent. Finally, the average inflation rate, ΔCPI, during the sample period 
was 3.33 percent, with the minimum and maximum at 1.43 and 5.27 respectively.
Bank Characteristics.—The summary statistics of Table 1 are based on the obser-
vations used in the first three regressions (that include only firm fixed effects). Bank 
balance-sheet data is taken at the end of the previous month (t − 1) and bank per-
formance information over the previous month. We employ lagged values as mon-
etary and economic conditions may determine the capital and liquidity ratios banks 
optimally choose.
The key bank balance-sheet variables we are interested in the bank’s CAPITAL 
RATIO as a measure of the bank’s net worth and the LIQuIDITy RATIO as a mea-
sure of its liquidity position (to distinguish them clearly from the corresponding 
firm ratios we add BANK in their label). The capital ratio is defined as the ratio 
of core capital over total assets of the bank (as in Bernanke and Lown 1991, for 
example). Core capital is defined as total equity plus retained earnings. As we use 
the book value of equity and assets are not risk adjusted, our measure is equivalent 
to a pure leverage ratio. Thus defined it has an average value of 5.4 percent. Unlike 
in the United States, there is no regulated minimum leverage ratio in Spain; hence, 
its minimum is very low (but results are not driven by this institutional difference as 
we show in robustness).
The LIQuIDITy RATIO is the ratio of liquid assets held by the bank (i.e., cash 
and deposits with central banks and other credit institutions, and public debt with 
a maturity up to one year) and the total assets of the bank. Banks on average held 
almost 17 percent of their balance sheet in liquid assets.
Lending behavior may vary across banks; hence, we control for bank variables 
that may affect bank lending (and in robustness also feature bank fixed effects). 
We therefore include: ln(TOTAL ASSETS), the log of the total assets of the bank (in 
2008 euros); ROA, the return on assets of the bank; DOuBTFuL LOANS RATIO, 
11 See Jayaratne and Morgan (2000); Kishan and Opiela (2000); Ashcraft (2006); and Black, Hancock, and 
Passmore (2009), among others. Kashyap and Stein (2000) find very similar results using either the variation in the 
federal funds rate, the Boschen and Mills (1995) index, or the Bernanke and Mihov (1998) measure.
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the doubtful loan ratio of the bank; and the HERFINDAHL By INDuSTRy, the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index of the bank’s credit portfolio by industry.
Firm Characteristics.—The composition of the pool of borrowers may change 
over time, and different firms may have different degrees of success in obtaining 
loans from banks. To control for these changes on the demand side, we include 
a broad set of firm characteristics and firm fixed effects. This set of effects 
controls for time-invariant unobserved firm heterogeneity. Later we introduce 
encompassing firm-month or loan fixed effects to account for all time-variant 
firm heterogeneity.
As firm-risk variables we feature: The CAPITAL RATIO, which is the ratio of own 
funds over total assets of the firm; the LIQuIDITy RATIO, the current assets over 
total assets of the firm; ln(TOTAL ASSETS ), the log of the total assets of the firm (in 
2008 euros); ln(1 + AGE), the log of one plus the age of the firm in years; ROA, 
the return on assets of the firm; I(DOuBTFuL LOANS AT THE TIME OF THE 
REQuEST ), a dummy variable that equals one if the firm had doubtful loans the 
month before the loan was requested and equals zero otherwise; and I(DOuBTFuL 
LOANS BEFORE THE TIME OF THE REQuEST ), a dummy variable that equals 
one if the firm had doubtful loans any time previous to the month before the loan 
was requested and equals zero otherwise.
As firm-bank relationship variables we include: ln(1 + NuMBER OF MONTHS 
WITH THE BANK ), which is the log of one plus the number of months that the firm 
had a working relationship with the bank (i.e., had outstanding loans with the bank; 
though the firm currently does not borrow from the bank, as we are analyzing bor-
rowing from new banks, the firm may have previously borrowed from the bank); 
and ln(1 + NuMBER OF BANK RELATIONSHIPS ), the log of the number of bank 
relationships of the firm.
As an industry time-varying characteristic we include INDuSTRy DOuBTFuL 
LOANS RATIO, which is the doubtful loan ratio of the industry in which the firm 
operates to control for the probability of loan rejections over the business cycle 
in the industry of the firm. As a province time-varying characteristic, we include 
ln(NuMBER OF BANKS ), which is the log of the number of banks in the province 
where the firm is located (a province in Spain roughly corresponds to a Metropolitan 
Statistical Area in the United States), and which may capture the number of banks 
that a firm can approach and the intensity of local bank competition.12
C. Specifications
The specifications we estimate are at the loan application level, and we match 
the loan application outcomes (whether the loan is granted or not) with the asso-
ciated macroeconomic, bank, firm, industry, and province information. That is, 
we control for—and exploit—the strength of the balance sheets of the banks 
associated with each loan application. Our empirical specifications assessing the 
12 All time-invariant firm characteristics, likely industry affiliation, location etc., are comprised by the firm fixed 
effects that are included in the specifications.
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 probability a loan application is granted are broadly structured as follows (vari-
able names are abridged):
(1) LOAN GRANTEDibt
   = βI ΔIRt + βG ΔGD P t + βI C ΔIRt × CA P bt−1 + βIL ΔIRt × LIQbt−1
 + βGC ΔGD P t × CAPbt−1 + βGL ΔGD P t × LIQbt−1 + macrot
 + bankbt−1 + firmit−1 + othert−1 + εibt .
The coefficients on the change in the short-term interest rate (IR) and GDP 
growth (GDP), and their interactions with bank capital (CAP) and liquidity (LIQ), 
comprise our two hypotheses. Hypothesis 1 is: βI < 0 and βG > 0. Hypothesis 
2 is: βIC > 0, βIL > 0, βGC < 0, and βGL < 0. The sets of macro, bank, firm, and 
other variables will be replaced consecutively by appropriate combinations of 
fixed effects. In particular, we first feature firm fixed effects, then additively intro-
duce both firm and month fixed effects, and, finally, introduce firm and month 
fixed effects multiplicatively (i.e., firm-month) or include loan fixed effects.13
D. Results
We first discuss the estimated impact of monetary and economic conditions (ΔIR 
and ΔGDP) and, second, and more important, the estimated coefficients of the inter-
actions between the economic and monetary conditions and the strength of the bank 
balance sheets—proxied by BANK CAPITAL RATIO and BANK LIQuIDITy RATIO.
Economic and Monetary Conditions.—Table 2 reports for the baseline linear 
probability model the estimated coefficients, in a second column the standard errors 
that are clustered at the bank-month level, i.e., the level at which the interaction 
terms—which are the main focus of our analysis—vary (see Moulton 1986 for 
example),14 followed in a third column by the corresponding significance levels.
We start analyzing the direct effects of monetary and economic conditions on the 
probability that the LOAN APPLICATION IS GRANTED. In Model (1) of Table 2 
we find that short-term interest rate hikes reduce loan granting, while GDP growth 
spurs loan granting (i.e., consistent with H1). A 100–basis point change in the inter-
est rate or GDP (their standard deviations equal 83 and 92 basis points, respectively) 
changes the probability a loan application is granted by 1.4 and 4.7 percentage 
points, respectively. As the average probability of loan granting equals 42 percent, 
the estimated semielasticities equal 3.3 and 11.2 percent, respectively.
13 In robustness, we further control for bank fixed effects and other variables.
14 ΔGDP is interpolated from a quarterly series; we alternatively aggregate and cluster at the bank-quarter level. 
We also multi-cluster errors simultaneously at the bank, firm, and month level (as in Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller 
2011) and employ the procedure advocated by Petersen (2009). The key specifications from Table 2 are included 
in online Appendix E.
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Table 2—Regression Results, Loan Granting and Monetary Conditions 
(Dependent variable: LOAN APPLICATION IS GRANTEDibt)
Model (1) (2) (3)
Macroeconomic controls (t)
 ΔIRt −1.394***(0.254)
− 5.960***
(0.625)
ΔIRt × BANK CAPITAL RATI O bt−1 33.384***(6.973)
29.991***
(6.979)
ΔIRt × BANK LIQuIDITy RATI O bt−1 15.396***(1.951)
13.343***
(2.044)
ΔGD P t 4.734***(0.256)
6.769***
(0.552)
ΔGD P t × BANK CAPITAL RATI O bt−1 − 28.580***(6.725)
− 28.728***
(6.539)
ΔGD P t × BANK LIQuIDITy RATI O bt−1 − 3.340(2.433)
− 2.916
(2.525)
ΔCPIt − 0.081(0.183)
− 0.027
(0.183)
Bank characteristics (b)
BANK CAPITAL RATI O bt−1 − 0.671***(0.058)
0.225
(0.218)
0.187
(0.214)
BANK LIQuIDITy RATI O bt−1 − 0.069***(0.017)
0.032
(0.080)
0.011
(0.084)
ln(TOTAL ASSET S bt−1 ) 0.001(0.001)
0.001
(0.001)
0.001
(0.001)
RO A bt−1 0.447(0.275)
0.473*
(0.267)
0.758***
(0.259)
DOuBTFuL LOANS RATI O bt−1 0.307**(0.154)
0.355**
(0.151)
0.237
(0.146)
HERFINDAHL By INDuSTR y bt−1 0.031*(0.016)
0.057***
(0.016)
0.075***
(0.016)
Firm characteristics (i )
FIRM CAPITAL RATI O it−1 0.015*(0.009)
0.015*
(0.009)
0.019**
(0.009)
FIRM LIQuIDITy RATI O it−1 −0.003(0.005)
− 0.003
(0.005)
− 0.003
(0.005)
ln(TOTAL ASSET S it−1 ) 0.000(0.002)
0.000
(0.002)
0.001
(0.002)
ln(1 + AG E it−1 ) 0.020***(0.005)
0.018***
(0.005)
0.026***
(0.004)
RO A it−1 0.082***(0.010)
0.083***
(0.010)
0.083***
(0.010)
I(DOuBTFuL LOANS AT THE TIME OF THE  
 REQuES T it−1 )
− 0.092***
(0.009)
− 0.092***
(0.009)
− 0.090***
(0.009)
I(DOuBTFuL LOANS BEFORE THE TIME OF THE 
 REQuES T it−1 )
− 0.037***
(0.007)
− 0.037***
(0.007)
− 0.033***
(0.007)
ln(1 + NuMBER OF MONTHS WITH THE BAN K ibt−1 ) 0.006***(0.001)
0.007***
(0.001)
0.007***
(0.001)
ln(1 + NuMBER OF BANK RELATIONSHIP S ibt−1 ) − 0.162***(0.003)
− 0.162***
(0.003)
− 0.161***
(0.003)
Industry characteristic (s)
INDuSTRy DOuBTFuL LOANS RATI O st−1 − 0.597***(0.193)
− 0.712***
(0.192)
−1.109***
(0.180)
(Continued )
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But of course, the specification is still incomplete. Though a comprehensive set of 
observable firm characteristics and firm fixed effects is included, the specifications 
do not yet account for unobserved time-variant firm heterogeneity (i.e., changes 
over time in the quality in the pool of applicant firms that apply for and obtain 
loans from different banks) nor identify the effects of the changes in monetary and 
economic conditions on loan granting through the strength of the balance sheets of 
banks. Before tackling both issues, we discuss the coefficients on the bank and firm 
characteristics once and, then, turn back to the focus of our study.
Bank and Firm Characteristics.—The estimated coefficients on a number of bank 
and firm characteristics are across all specifications statistically significant, econom-
ically relevant, stable, and in line with straightforward priors. These results suggest, 
therefore, that these controls are at once needed and relevant.
More solvent and liquid banks are less prone to lend to new borrowers. Riskier 
banks (i.e., with higher NPL ratios and more industry concentrated loan portfo-
lios) have a higher probability of granting loans to new borrowers. These results 
are further robust to the inclusion of firm-month or loan application fixed effects for 
example (unreported). Therefore, either using capital and liquidity ratios or other 
measures of bank strength, we find a negative sign. The introduction of interactions 
of bank capital and liquidity with the change in the interest rate or GDP growth rate 
reverses the signs on these variables.
The coefficient on firm capital and liquidity are only marginally or not significant, 
though capital becomes significant in models featuring interactions of bank capi-
tal and liquidity with economic and monetary conditions. Loan applications from 
older and more profitable firms, from firms with fewer doubtful loans at or prior to 
the loan application or from an industry with a lower doubtful loan ratio, and from 
firms with longer and fewer bank relationships located in a province with many 
banks may be more successful in applying. Hence, ceteris paribus more firms with a 
stronger balance sheet and with a longer and more impeccable track record can rely 
Table 2—Regression Results, Loan Granting and Monetary Conditions 
(Dependent variable: LOAN APPLICATION IS GRANTEDibt)(Continued )
Model (1) (2) (3)
Province characteristic (p)
ln(NuMBER OF BANK S pt−1 ) 0.109***(0.014)
0.110***
(0.014)
0.107***
(0.014)
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Month fixed effects No No Yes
Observations 816,852 816,852 816,852
Number of bank-month clusters 9,910 9,910 9,910
Sample period 2002:02–
2008:12
2002:02–
2008:12
2002:02–
2008:12
Notes: The table reports the estimated coefficients and robust standard errors (in parentheses) clustered at the bank-
month level from linear probability models estimated using least squares. Fixed effects are included (“yes”) or not 
included (“no”). The set of month fixed effects includes a fixed effect for every (but one) year:month during the 
sample period. The variable definitions and summary statistics are in Table 1.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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more on external financing (as in Jensen and Meckling 1976), and so can firms with 
stronger and bilateral relationships in competitive banking markets (see Freixas 
and Rochet 2008; and Degryse, Kim, and Ongena 2009 for reviews of theory and 
empirical evidence).
Overall, we find these estimated coefficients reasonable and their statistical signif-
icance and stability reassuring for our investigation of the different credit channels 
(as the working of these channels requires the imperfect substitutability between 
external and internal financing that is especially acute for small and opaque firms).
Bank Balance-Sheet Channel.—Model (2) analyzes the impact of monetary 
and economic conditions on loan granting through the bank balance-sheet chan-
nel. Model (2) therefore includes the interactions of the change in the short-term 
interest rate and GDP growth with bank capital and liquidity ratios suggested by 
Hypothesis 2 (H2). As explained in the previous sections, interest rate changes and 
GDP growth are not highly correlated in Spain because of the relatively low level 
of synchronization of economic activity in Spain vis-à-vis the largest euro area 
countries, even after 1999 (Giannone, Lenza, and Reichlin 2010). This allows us to 
exploit simultaneously the variation in monetary conditions and output interacted 
with bank capital and liquidity.
The estimates in Model (2) suggest that the negative effect of positive changes 
in the short-term interest rate or lower GDP growth on the probability that a LOAN 
APPLICATION IS GRANTED is stronger for banks with low capital or liquidity. To 
put it differently, “weaker” banks are more procyclical (in interest rate or GDP) in 
terms of loan granting than stronger ones. Hence, overall H2 is confirmed.
We now further explore the economic relevance of these estimated effects. We 
calculate the difference in semielasticities following changes in the short-term inter-
est rate or GDP growth for banks with a low versus high capital or liquidity ratio 
(tenth versus ninetieth percentile, as in Kashyap and Stein 2000), i.e., at banks with 
a capital ratio of 3.5 versus 8.4 percent or a liquidity ratio of 7.7 versus 27.7 percent.
A 100–basis point increase in the interest rate decreases loan granting by lowly 
capitalized banks by 3.9 percent more than by highly capitalized banks, and by 
7.3 percent more by lowly than by highly liquid banks. Therefore, weak banks (with 
both low capital and liquidity) on average decline loan granting by 11.4 percent 
more than strong banks. A 100–basis point decrease in GDP growth decreases loan 
granting by lowly capitalized banks by 3.4 percent more than by highly capitalized 
banks, and by 1.6 percent more by lowly than by highly liquid banks (the latter dif-
ference is not statistically significant, however).15 Hence, the change in the interest 
rate for the bank lending channel has a much larger differential impact in this case 
on loan granting than a similarly sized change in GDP growth (recall that their 
standard deviations were both close to 100 basis points), though the effect goes 
especially through bank liquidity.
15 The calculations are: for the interest rate: 0.039 = (0.01 × 33.384 × (0.035 − 0.084))/0.42 and 0.073 = (0.01 
× 15.396 × (0.077 − 0.277))/0.42; for GDP: 0.034 = (− 0.01 × −28.580 × (0.035 − 0.084))/0.42 and 0.016 
= (−0.01 × −3.340 × (0.077 − 0.277))/0.42.
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Our estimates capture the immediate impact on the probability of loan granting 
across all banks.16 The estimated effects are sizeable, yet the total impact on bank 
lending may be even larger if banks are slow to react to the changes in monetary 
or economic conditions, for example. The estimates strongly suggest that the bank 
balance-sheet channel of monetary policy is very potent.
Various Effects Models.—We now present the estimates of various fixed effects mod-
els. In Model (3) in Table 2 we add month fixed effects to the firm fixed effects. The set 
of month fixed effects includes a fixed effect for every (but one) year:month during the 
sample period. Month fixed effects capture the changes in economywide conditions, 
such as current and future expectations of GDP growth, inflation, and interest rates 
and general shocks affecting the economy. Hence, all variables at the country level 
are dropped from the empirical model, and the identification entirely comes from the 
interactions. Importantly, the estimated coefficients are similar to those in Model (2).
In Model (1) in Table 3, our benchmark regression, we replace the firm and 
month fixed effects by firm-month fixed effects.17 A firm-month fixed effects 
model accounts for the impact on loan granting of all observed time-varying firm 
characteristics (e.g., firm size and credit rating) and unobserved time-varying 
firm characteristics such as firm risk, quality, investment opportunities, the strength 
of the firm’s bank relationships, and access to market finance (Petersen and Rajan 
1994, among others). Including the set of all time dummies for each firm in the 
sample implies that all the independent firm characteristics (in addition to macro 
variables) have to be dropped from the model. In addition, to be included in the 
regression a firm must have filed more than one loan application within the same 
month, reducing in turn the number of observations from 816,852 to 328,891 (sum-
mary statistics are provided in online Appendix D). All estimated coefficients are 
similar to Models (2) and (3) in Table 2, and so is the resulting economic relevancy 
of these estimates. A 100–basis point increase in the interest rate decreases loan 
granting by lowly capitalized banks by 3.8 percent more than by highly capitalized 
banks, and by 6.2 percent more by lowly than by highly liquid banks. A 100–basis 
point decrease in GDP growth decreases loan granting by lowly capitalized banks 
by 3.4 percent more than by highly capitalized banks, and by 1.6 percent more by 
lowly than by highly liquid banks.18
In addition, in Model (2) in Table 3 we present estimates from a loan fixed effects 
model, where a firm must have filed multiple applications within the same month 
16 Kashyap and Stein (2000) find that four quarters following a 100–basis point hike in the federal funds rate the 
level of C&I loans of the illiquid small bank will be between 0.6 and 5.3 percent lower than that of the liquid small 
bank. For large banks, there may be no or even a positive effect. The ratio of securities plus federal funds sold to 
total assets of the small banks (< 95 percent by asset size) varies between 21 and 60 percent (i.e., the tenth versus 
ninetieth percentile). See also Bernanke and Lown (1991), who estimate that changes in credit following changes 
in economic conditions may be modest.
17 Though they were not included in Kashyap and Stein (2000), for example, we further add bank fixed effects 
that capture the still-unaccounted-for bank heterogeneity that is fixed over time. We report representative estimates 
in online Appendix G. Results are unaffected throughout, except for the coefficient on the interaction between GDP 
growth and bank liquidity, which turns statistically significant, and the coefficient on the interaction between the 
interest rate changes and bank capital, which reduces in absolute size. The latter finding is not surprising, as 
the largest part of variation of bank capital is between but not within banks.
18 The calculations are: for the interest rate: 0.038 = (0.01 × 28.566 × (0.035 − 0.084))/0.37 and 0.062 = (0.01 
× 11.548 × (0.077 − 0.277))/0.37; for GDP: 0.042 = (− 0.01 × −31.426 × (0.035 − 0.084))/0.37 and 0.009 
= (−0.01 × −1.602 × (0.077 − 0.277))/0.37.
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for the same loan to different banks that resulted in at most one granted loan. The 
number of observations decreases to 263,042 (summary statistics are again provided 
in online Appendix D). Results are again very similar to Model (3) in Table 2.
The estimates are further robust to the inclusion of the recent exceptionally severe 
crisis period in Spain, which increases the number of observations to 427,364. The 
estimates are tabulated in Model (3) in Table 3. Therefore, despite the fact that 
monetary policy was executed in different ways during the recent crisis, the bank 
lending channel of monetary policy (through changes in short-term interest rates) 
retained its potency.
Table 3—Regression Results, Loan Granting and Monetary Conditions  
with Firm-Month or Loan Fixed Effects 
(Dependent variable: LOAN APPLICATION IS GRANTEDibt)
Model (1) (2) (3) (4)
Macroeconomic controls (t)
 ΔIRt × BANK CAPITAL RATI O bt−1 28.566***(6.822)
30.081***
(7.737)
19.873***
(5.681)
49.477***
(16.241)
ΔIRt × BANK LIQuIDITy 
 RATI O bt−1 
11.548***
(2.019)
12.269***
(2.286)
5.190***
(1.926)
10.412**
(4.537)
ΔGD P t × BANK CAPITAL 
 RATI O bt−1 
− 31.426***
(5.669)
− 37.078***
(5.994)
− 25.668***
(3.175)
−12.594
(15.468)
ΔGD P t × BANK LIQuIDITy
 RATI O bt−1 
−1.602
(2.035)
−1.877
(2.166)
− 2.375**
(1.109)
6.947
(4.945)
Bank characteristics (b)
BANK CAPITAL RATI O bt−1 0.308*(0.184)
0.389**
(0.191)
0.175*
(0.093) − 0.810(0.503)
BANK LIQuIDITy RATI O bt−1 − 0.075(0.066)
− 0.062
(0.070)
− 0.055
(0.035)
− 0.489***
(0.162)
ln(TOTAL ASSET S bt−1 ) − 0.001(0.001)
− 0.003***
(0.001)
0.001
(0.001) − 0.006***(0.002)
RO A bt−1 1.252***(0.233)
1.355***
(0.261)
1.434***
(0.218)
1.371**
(0.533)
DOuBTFuL LOANS 
 RATI O bt−1 
0.158
(0.145)
0.136
(0.164) − 0.286***(0.088)
− 0.693**
(0.337)
HERFINDAHL By INDuSTR y bt−1 0.016(0.015)
0.018
(0.017)
0.002
(0.014)
0.056*
(0.033)
Firm characteristics (i)
ln(1 + NuMBER OF MONTHS
 WITH THE BAN K ibt−1 )
0.010***
(0.001)
0.013***
(0.001)
0.011***
(0.001)
0.026***
(0.004)
Firm-month fixed effects Yes No Yes Yes
Loan fixed effects No Yes No No
Observations 328,891 263,042 427,364 55,025
Number of bank-month 
 clusters
8,714 8,310 10,637 6,022
Sample period 2002:02–
2008:12
2002:02–
2008:12
2002:02–
2010:06
2002:02–
2008:12
Notes: The table reports the estimated coefficients and robust standard errors (in parentheses) clustered at the 
bank-month level from linear probability models estimated using least squares. The sample employed in Model (4) 
includes only borrowers that are noncurrent to all banks. Fixed effects are included (“yes”) or not included (“no”). 
The set of month fixed effects includes a fixed effect for every (but one) year:month during the sample period. The 
variable definitions and summary statistics are in Table 1.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Estimates are also robust to: The inclusion of the double balance-sheet interac-
tions with the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of bank lending in the province;19 the 
use of a logit specification (as discussed earlier, employing logit models reduces 
the number of observations to 155,167); the left-censoring of bank capital ratio at 
4 percent (as in the United States, for example); the inclusion of interactions of the 
change in the short-term interest rate and GDP growth with all (other) bank char-
acteristics; the removal of the interactions with GDP growth; and the inclusion of a 
variable capturing the number of loans the firm currently obtains from the bank. In 
each case, the estimates for at least the most-demanding, benchmark model using 
firm-month fixed effects are reported in online Appendices F and G.
In sum, Models (1) and (2) in Table 3 show that within the set of applications made 
in the same month by the same firm to different banks, and within the set of different 
applications made for the same loan, fewer loans are granted by banks with low capital 
or liquidity when short-term interest rate increases are larger or by banks with low 
capital when GDP growth is lower. Assuming that the very small changes in firm qual-
ity that occur during each month are not correlated with the quality of the approached 
banks—which is the case, for example, if firm quality is constant within each month—
our results imply that under tighter macro conditions (e.g., tighter monetary policy or 
a recession) a capital crunch begets a credit crunch. This is a key result since Bernanke 
and Lown (1991, p. 207) define credit crunch as “a significant leftward shift in the sup-
ply curve for loans, holding constant both the safe real interest rate and the quality of 
potential borrowers” (our italicizing). As far as we are aware we are the first to identify 
and document in such a clear-cut way (i.e., it is the same firm that does apply at the 
same time or for the same loan to several banks) the occurrence of a credit crunch.
Loan Applications from Current Borrowers.—Our estimations so far focused 
on the probability that loan applications from noncurrent borrowers get approved. 
However, firms may initially apply to banks they currently don’t borrow from, but 
if their applications fail return to their current lenders to obtain new loans there. 
These “applications of last resort” with current lenders will not trigger information 
requests because lenders automatically obtain monthly information from the CIR on 
all their current borrowers. Not including such applications may bias our findings.
To address this potential problem, Model (4) in Table 3 studies lending to all bor-
rowers without any outstanding bank debt (hence, borrowers without any current 
lender). The estimation in Model (4) is based on 55,025 loan applications made by 
firms that have no bank debt outstanding at t − 1. The coefficients on the interaction 
terms again confirm the existence of a bank balance sheet channel of monetary policy.
Credit Substitution.—Finally, we want to investigate whether the loan sup-
ply restrictions we identified so far are binding and cannot be fully offset by 
firms turning to other banks. We look at this possible substitution mechanism in 
two ways: (i) directly, by conditioning on firms that did not get any loan following 
19 If product market competition is a strong substitute for corporate governance (Giroud and Mueller 2009), 
then in regions with tougher competition among banks agency costs may be reduced so that the bank balance-sheet 
channel may be less potent. We find this to be the case for GDP–capital ratio interaction, but not for the other 
three interactions, suggesting that in banking more competition does not necessarily reduce moral hazard.
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an initial round of loan applications, and then determining whether such a firm 
receives a loan from an alternative bank after a new round of applications in the 
subsequent three months; (ii) indirectly, by analyzing whether a firm gets a bank 
loan from any bank (including its current lenders) given that the firm has at least 
one loan application.
The first dependent variable is FuTuRE LOAN APPLICATION IS GRANTED 
FOLLOWING REJECTION, which equals one if at least one loan application by a 
firm within three months is approved and the loan is granted by a bank given that 
loan applications did not result in a loan, and equals zero otherwise. The upper 
panel in Table 4 provides the summary statistics for the 117,152 observations. The 
probability that at least one application within three months following a rejection is 
successful equals 37 percent.
Table 4—Summary Statistics
Variable Units Definition Mean SD Min Median Max
Dependent variable
 FuTuRE LOAN APPLICATION
 IS GRANTED FOLLOWING 
 REJECTIONibt
0/1 =1 if at least one future loan application 
by a firm is approved and the loan is 
granted by a bank given that a loan 
application was rejected during the 
previous three months, =0 otherwise
0.37 0.48 0 0 1
Independent variables
Macroeconomic conditions (t)
ΔIRt % Annual change of Spanish 3-month 
interbank interest rates
0.26 0.82 −1.56 0.43 1.41
ΔGDPt % Annual change of Spanish gross domes-
tic product in real terms
3.01 1.09 − 0.85 3.35 3.98
ΔCPIt % Annual change of Spanish Consumer 
Price Index
3.35 0.84 1.43 3.40 5.27
Bank characteristics (b)
BANK CAPITAL RATIObt−1 % The ratio of bank equity over total as-
sets of the bank
5.31 2.04 0.00 4.83 61.75
BANK LIQuIDITy RATIObt−1 % The ratio of liquid assets (cash and 
balance with central banks, and loans 
and advances to governments and credit 
institutions) held by the bank over the 
total assets of the bank
16.50 7.86 0.04 15.52 91.62
ln(TOTAL ASSETSbt−1) — The log of the total assets of the bank 17.36 1.45 10.06 17.56 20.76
TOTAL ASSETSbt−1 000,000.000 
EUR
The total assets of the bank 76.50 91.00 0.02 42.40 1,030.00
ROAbt−1 % The total net income over assets of the 
bank
0.93 0.55 − 8.93 0.90 11.92
DOuBTFuL LOANS RATIObt−1 % The doubtful loan ratio of the bank 0.90 0.92 0.00 0.61 17.36
HERFINDAHL By INDuSTRybt−1 % The Herfindahl-Hirschman index of the 
bank’s credit portfolio by industry
27.21 9.21 12.77 24.15 87.94
Average approached bank characteristics (b)
BANK CAPITAL RATIObt−1 % The ratio of bank equity over total as-
sets of the bank
5.25 1.89 0.00 4.77 61.75
BANK LIQuIDITy RATIObt−1 % The ratio of liquid assets (cash and 
balance with central banks, and loans 
and advances to governments and credit 
institutions) held by the bank over the 
total assets of the bank
16.37 7.48 0.04 15.53 91.37
ln(TOTAL ASSETSbt−1) — The log of the total assets of the bank 17.49 1.39 10.14 17.69 20.76
TOTAL ASSETSbt−1 000,000.000 
EUR
The total assets of the bank 80.80 91.20 0.03 48.20 1040.00
ROAbt−1 % The return on assets of the bank 0.93 0.50 −8.93 0.89 11.92
DOuBTFuL LOANS RATIObt−1 % The doubtful loan ratio of the bank 0.96 1.01 0.00 0.62 31.24
HERFINDAHL By INDuSTRybt−1 % The Herfindahl-Hirschman index of the 
bank’s credit portfolio by industry
27.10 8.69 13.88 24.45 86.67
(Continued )
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We are interested in knowing both whether credit substitution is more difficult dur-
ing periods of tighter monetary policy or worse economic conditions, and whether 
this process is affected by the strength of bank balance sheets. We control for the 
balance-sheet quality of the assessing bank and of the average bank approached by 
the firm (indexed b), and as before for firm, industry, and province characteristics 
(to conserve space these estimates are left unreported). Table 5 displays two repre-
sentative models: Model (1) features firm fixed effects, Model (2) firm and month 
fixed effects.20
The estimated coefficients indicate that an increase in the interest rate or a decrease 
in GDP growth increases the probability that subsequent loan applications by a firm 
will be rejected (especially when the bank is weakly capitalized or liquid).21
Next, we analyze the second variable, called FuTuRE LOAN APPLICATION 
IS GRANTED AFTER EARLIER APPLICATION IS MADE, which equals one if at 
least one loan is granted by any bank to a firm within the next three months given 
20 Obviously, it is not possible to answer this set of questions with firm-time fixed effects.
21 The difference in semielasticities for a 100–basis point increase (decrease) in the interest rate (GDP growth) 
between low and high bank capital and liquidity ratios equals 1.3 (2.5) and 4.9 (0.2) percent, respectively.
Variable Units Definition Mean SD Min Median Max
Dependent variable
FuTuRE LOAN APPLICATION 
 IS GRANTED AFTER 
 EARLIER APPLICATION IS 
 MADEibt
0/1 =1 if at least one future loan application 
by a firm is approved and the loan is 
granted by a bank given that a loan ap-
plication was made during the previous 
three months, =0 otherwise
0.79 0.41 0 1 1
Independent variables
Macroeconomic conditions (t)
ΔIRt % Annual change of Spanish 3-month 
interbank interest rates
0.18 0.83 −1.56 0.11 1.41
ΔGD P t % Annual change of Spanish gross domes-
tic product in real terms
3.13 0.92 − 0.85 3.35 3.98
ΔCPIt % Annual change of Spanish Consumer 
Price Index
3.32 0.77 1.43 3.40 5.27
Bank characteristics (b)
BANK CAPITAL RATIObt−1 % The ratio of bank equity over total as-
sets of the bank
5.66 1.27 0.00 5.49 50.03
BANK LIQuIDITy RATIObt−1 % The ratio of liquid assets (cash and 
balance with central banks, and loans 
and advances to governments and credit 
institutions) held by the bank over the 
total assets of the bank
16.88 5.35 0.04 16.22 91.21
ln(TOTAL ASSETSbt−1) — The log of the total assets of the bank 18.07 0.88 9.91 18.27 19.90
TOTAL ASSETSbt−1 000,000.000 
EUR
The total assets of the bank 91.90 56.30 0.02 86.20 437.00
ROAbt−1 % The total net income over assets of the 
bank
1.02 0.33 − 8.93 1.00 5.25
DOuBTFuL LOANS RATIObt−1 % The doubtful loan ratio of the bank 0.81 0.60 0.00 0.63 20.50
HERFINDAHL By INDuSTRybt−1 % The Herfindahl-Hirschman index of the 
bank’s credit portfolio by industry
26.07 6.21 13.44 25.30 81.02
Selected firm characteristics (i )
NuMBER OF BANK 
 RELATIONSHIPSibt−1
— The number of bank relationships of 
the firm
3.66 3.47 0 3 102
ln(1 + NUMBER OF BANK 
 RELATIONSHIPSibt−1)
— The log of the number of bank relation-
ships of the firm
1.33 0.64 0 1.39 4.63
Notes: The number of observations equals 117,152 in the top panel and 746,341 in the bottom panel. EUR 
= 2008 euros.
Table 4—Summary Statistics (Continued )
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that a loan application was made in that month, and equals zero otherwise. The 
number of observations increases to 746,341 (from 117,152), while the mean prob-
ability that a loan is granted increases to 79 percent (from 37 percent).
Table 6 displays representative models with firm fixed effects (1) and with firm and 
month fixed effects (2). We find that higher interest rates or lower GDP growth reduce 
the probability of obtaining any bank loans, after an initial loan application by a firm 
is made (and, for monetary policy, these effects are stronger for weaker banks).
Table 5—Regression Results, Loan Granting and Past Rejections 
(Dependent variable: FuTuRE LOAN APPLICATION IS GRANTED FOLLOWING REJECTIONibt)
Model (1) (2)
Macroeconomic controls (t)
ΔIRt − 7.083***(1.407)
ΔIRt × BANK CAPITAL RATIObt−1 23.892**(10.967)
17.980*
(10.618)
ΔIRt × BANK LIQuIDITy RATIObt−1 23.888***(4.175)
15.367***
(3.548)
ΔGD P t 5.451***(0.857)
ΔGD P t × BANK CAPITAL RATIObt−1 − 33.757***(9.170)
− 34.035***
(9.403)
ΔGD P t × BANK LIQuIDITy RATIObt−1 0.169(2.944)
− 0.070
(2.549)
 ΔCPIt −1.363**(0.553)
Bank characteristics (b)
BANK CAPITAL RATIObt−1 0.084(0.095)
0.035
(0.093)
BANK LIQuIDITy RATIObt−1 − 0.019(0.027)
− 0.016
(0.027)
ln(TOTAL ASSETSbt−1) 0.001(0.001)
0.001
(0.001)
ROAbt−1 − 0.052(0.270)
0.248
(0.278)
DOuBTFuL LOANS RATIObt−1 − 0.362(0.227)
− 0.240
(0.240)
HERFINDAHL By INDuSTRybt−1 0.034(0.028)
0.040
(0.025)
Average approached bank characteristics (b)
BANK CAPITAL RATIObt−1 1.083***(0.287)
1.051***
(0.294)
BANK LIQuIDITy RATIObt−1 − 0.016(0.089)
− 0.002
(0.077)
ln(TOTAL ASSETSbt−1) 0.037***(0.002)
0.036***
(0.002)
ROAbt−1 0.952**(0.437)
1.339***
(0.417)
DOuBTFuL LOANS RATIObt−1 1.038***(0.341)
1.061***
(0.306)
HERFINDAHL By INDuSTRybt−1 0.111***(0.029)
0.094***
(0.030)
(Continued )
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All in all, from the two models we find that a firm cannot simply turn to other 
banks to undo a rejection of a loan application that is due to tightening monetary or 
economic conditions channeled.
We interact in Models (3) and (4) the number of bank relationships (which equals 
the number of banks the firm is currently borrowing from) with the change in the 
interest rate or GDP growth, and with bank capital or liquidity. That is, we examine 
whether the bank lending channel is less potent as the banking relationship is stronger.
Results are striking and take one additional last step in identifying a bank bal-
ance-sheet channel. The estimated coefficients on the newly introduced double 
and triple interactions are not only statistically significant, but also economically 
meaningful (online Appendix H). Improving conditions increase the difference 
between the loan granting probabilities of weak and strong banks, but this effect is 
mitigated for firms that are engaged with several banks. For firms that are engaged 
with three banks the difference is one-third the difference for firms that currently 
do not have a bank relationship.
III. Conclusions and Policy Implications
Does the stance of monetary policy and business cycle fluctuations affect credit 
supply? And, if so, how relevant is the bank balance-sheet channel? These questions 
are not only key for macroeconomics in general, but also for policymaking (the han-
dling of the current crisis in particular). However, to answer these questions there 
are two main identification challenges: (i) Monetary and economic conditions affect 
both credit demand and supply. (ii) Separating the effects of monetary conditions 
and economic activity is also problematic as short-term interest rate changes may be 
completely determined by the business cycle.
Table 5—Regression Results, Loan Granting and Past Rejections 
(Dependent variable: FuTuRE LOAN APPLICATION IS GRANTED FOLLOWING REJECTIONibt) (Continued )
Model (1) (2)
Selected firm characteristics (i )
ln(1 + NuMBER OF BANK RELATIONSHIPSibt−1) − 0.164***(0.010)
− 0.165***
(0.010)
Other firm (i ), industry (s), and province (p) characteristics, constant Yes Yes
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes
Month fixed effects No Yes
Observations 117,152 117,152
Number of month clusters 83 83
Period 2002:02–2008:12 2002:02–2008:12
Notes: The table reports the estimated coefficients and robust standard errors (in parentheses) clustered at the 
monthly level from linear probability models estimated using least squares. The set of included bank (b), firm (i ), 
industry (s), and province (p) characteristics is the same as in Table 2. Fixed effects are included (“yes”) or not 
included (“no”). The set of month fixed effects includes a fixed effect for every (but one) year:month during the 
sample period. The variable definitions and summary statistics of selected variables are in Table 1.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Table 6—Regression Results, Loan Granting and Past Applications 
(Dependent variable: FuTuRE LOAN APPLICATION IS GRANTED AFTER EARLIER APPLICATION IS MADEibt)
Model (1) (2) (3) (4)
Macroeconomic controls (t)
ΔIRt − 3.184***(0.743)
− 5.781***
(1.344)
ΔIRt × BANK CAPITAL RATIObt−1 12.337*(7.007)
12.486*
(6.942)
39.628**
(16.046)
37.993**
(15.600)
ΔIRt × BANK LIQuIDITy RATIObt−1 7.491***(2.146)
6.643***
(1.679)
14.740***
(4.310)
13.292***
(3.995)
ΔGD P t 4.968***(0.545)
8.162***
(1.156)
ΔGD P t × BANK CAPITAL RATIObt−1 − 35.679***(5.784)
− 31.473***
(5.431)
− 87.526***
(17.132)
− 83.131***
(16.768)
ΔGD P t × BANK LIQuIDITy RATIObt−1 − 7.539***(2.283)
− 3.200**
(1.486)
0.757
(4.639)
4.614
(4.260)
ΔCPIt − 0.078(0.123)
− 0.099
(0.120)
Bank characteristics (b)
BANK CAPITAL RATIObt−1 1.284***(0.198)
1.061***
(0.188)
2.988***
(0.592)
2.844***
(0.577)
BANK LIQuIDITy RATIObt−1 0.224***(0.080)
0.041
(0.054) − 0.109(0.153)
− 0.229
(0.139)
ln(TOTAL ASSETSbt−1) 0.003***(0.001)
0.007***
(0.001)
0.003***
(0.001)
0.007***
(0.001)
ROAbt−1 0.171(0.203)
0.691***
(0.196)
0.111
(0.203)
0.624***
(0.198)
DOuBTFuL LOANS RATIObt−1 0.282(0.182)
0.132
(0.179)
0.222
(0.183)
0.098
(0.181)
HERFINDAHL By INDuSTRybt−1 − 0.026(0.020)
0.073***
(0.020) − 0.013(0.019)
0.075***
(0.020)
Selected firm characteristics (i )
ln(1 + NuMBER OF BANK RELATIONSHIPSibt−1) − 0.002(0.003)
− 0.001
(0.003)
0.059**
(0.023)
0.070***
(0.024)
Interactions with ln(1 + NuMBER OF BANK RELATIONSHIPS)
ΔIRt × ln(1 + NuMBER OF BANK 
 RELATIONSHIPSibt−1)
2.193***
(0.681)
2.004**
(0.827)
ΔIRt × BANK CAPITAL RATIObt−1 
 × ln(1 + NuMBER OF BANK 
 RELATIONSHIPSibt−1)
− 21.042**
(9.284)
− 19.165**
(9.320)
ΔIRt × BANK LIQuIDITy RATIObt−1 
 × ln(1 + NuMBER OF BANK 
 RELATIONSHIPSibt−1)
− 6.127**
(2.517)
− 5.780*
(2.959)
ΔGDPt × ln(1 + NuMBER OF BANK 
 RELATIONSHIPSibt−1)
− 2.304***
(0.657)
− 2.275***
(0.711)
ΔGDPt × BANK CAPITAL RATIObt−1 
 × ln(1 + NuMBER OF BANK 
 RELATIONSHIPSibt−1)
39.880***
(11.314)
39.325***
(11.185)
ΔGD P t × BANK LIQuIDITy RATIObt−1 
 × ln(1 + NuMBER OF BANK 
 RELATIONSHIPSibt−1)
− 6.113**
(2.805)
− 5.908**
(2.870)
ln(1 + NuMBER OF BANK RELATIONSHIPSibt−1)  × BANK CAPITAL RATIObt−1
− 1.295***
(0.391)
−1.355***
(0.384)
ln(1 + NuMBER OF BANK RELATIONSHIPSibt−1)  × BANK LIQuIDITy RATIObt−1
0.263***
(0.089)
0.215**
(0.089)
(Continued )
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Our contribution to the literature lies in meeting these two identification chal-
lenges. We use a unique and comprehensive loan-level dataset that is managed by 
the bank supervisor in Spain. The dataset contains for the last nine years all monthly 
information requests by banks following loan applications from firms that are cur-
rently not borrowing from them (we also use the information on all granted loans 
to nonfinancial firms by all credit institutions data for the last 20 years in robust-
ness). This dataset helps us to separate loan supply from demand. Spain is a bank-
dominated country with pronounced business cycles including a severe contraction 
under way and a fairly exogenous monetary policy.
We analyze the extensive margin of lending with loan applications and find the fol-
lowing two results: (i) Higher short-term interest rates or lower GDP growth reduce 
loan granting. (ii) The negative effect of higher short-term interest rates or lower 
GDP growth on credit availability is stronger for banks with low capital or liquid-
ity. Hence, the monetary policy and the business cycle effects work through a bank 
lending channel. Moreover, within the set of different applications from the same 
firm in the same month or for the same loan to different banks (i.e., keeping constant 
the quality of potential borrowers), we find that banks with low capital or liquidity 
grant fewer loans when short-term interest rates are higher or GDP growth is lower. 
Therefore, our results suggest that, under tighter monetary and economic conditions, 
a reduction in bank capital begets a credit crunch. Finally, we investigate whether 
the so-identified loan supply restrictions are binding and cannot be offset by firms 
turning to other banks. We find they cannot, especially not by firms that have no or 
few existing bank relationships.
As our estimates indicate the bank lending channel is potent, the implications 
of our analysis for both theory and policy are generally obvious and immediate. In 
particular, given that we find that expansive monetary policy has more potency when 
bank balance sheets are weak, during a crisis like the recent one the use of monetary 
policy rates to support credit supply seems advisable.
Table 6—Regression Results, Loan Granting and Past Applications 
(Dependent variable: FuTuRE LOAN APPLICATION IS GRANTED AFTER EARLIER APPLICATION IS MADEibt) (Continued )
Model (1) (2) (3) (4)
Other firm (i ), industry (s), and province ( p) 
 characteristics, constant
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month fixed effects No Yes No Yes
Observations 746,341 746,341 746,341 746,341
Number of month clusters 83 83 83 83
Period 2002:02–
2008:12
2002:02–
2008:12
2002:02–
2008:12
2002:02–
2008:12
Notes: The table reports the estimated coefficients and robust standard errors (in parentheses) clustered at the 
monthly level from linear probability models estimated using least squares. The set of included bank (b), firm (i ), 
industry (s), and province ( p) characteristics is the same as in Table 2. Fixed effects are included (“yes”) or not 
included (“no”). The set of month fixed effects includes a fixed effect for every (but one) year:month during the 
sample period. The variable definitions and summary statistics of selected variables are in Table 1.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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